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THE BEIJING SPRING, 1989 
~ climax ~f .China's spring 1989 
student protest movement is well known, at 
least outside of China. Troops acting to clear 
Tiananmen Square of protesters and enforce _ 
martial law succeeded in their charge, firing 
automatic assault weapons on unarmed citizens 
and sometimes wildly into neighboring build-
ings. People were crushed under the tracks of 
armored personnel carriers as they moved in to 
smash the statue of ~the "Goddess ,of Democ-
racy" that had come almost overnight to 
symbolize the movement. Some students tried 
nonviolent protest tactics, sitting in before the 
troops. They were shot. Eyewitness- reports 
emphasized the frenzied activity of the sol-
diers, their excessive and sometimes almost 
aimless violence. But though some may have 
run amok, there is no doubt that the overall 
attack was consciously ~planned. 
Some of the· soldiers were killed-, mainly 
burned as crowds torched their vehicles. A few 
were beaten. Though- dead students cannot be 
mourned publicly, China's government has 
gone to great length to honor the soldiers as 
martyrs, and to publish graphic accounts of 
their deaths. Student leaders had urged nonvio-
lence, but the crowds by this point were not 
composed primarily of students. 
Though these stark outlines of the massacre 
are known, it is much- harder to make sense of 
it. We can only make educated guesses as to 
what the government was doing. Even harder 
to ferret out is clear evidence for just -who was 
acting as the government at that point, what 
combination of the _various factions that had 
used the student movement as an occasion for 
their own power struggles. We know-that Zhao 
Ziyang and many of his associates and fellow 
An Eyewitness Account 
"liberalizers" were toppled, but we do not 
know -and probably never will know exactly the 
course of events that brought this about. We 
know that the go¥ernment ~had been almost 
incapacitated by its internal struggles in the 
preceding weeks. But we do not know to what 
extent the events of the night of June 3 and 
morning of June 4 represented the policy of 
factions that had already succeeded in gaining 
power. or to- what extent they were themselves 
tactics in the power struggle. Certainly they 
eliminated the argument that the Chinese 
government should use moderation to avoid 
inflaming world opinion. After the massacre, 
world opinion was already forfeit. 
Since June 4 attention has been focused, 
ironically. on the killers not the killed, on the 
Chinese government and not the student 
protesters. It is important, however, not to let 
geopolitical considerations or the practical 
concerns with who has emerged on the top rung 
of Chinese leadership obscure the movement 
itself. Even our horror at the massacre should 
not make us forget just how remarkable an 
event this protest was~ For the Chinese people. 
it has value as an inspiration, not just a 
cautionary tale. 
I want here to look at some of the conditions 
and tactics that made the protest movement 
possible. My comments are based mainly on 
six weeks of "participant observation. •• They 
are not a final evaluation or a comprehensive 
report. They are an attempt to draw out certain 
key themes from the vantage point of the 
student activists. They leave many gaps, but, I 
hope, add a few points not always m~de ·in 
recent Western discussions. In particular, I do 
not try here to go very much into the question 
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of students' ideology or goals in the movement. 
The present essay is not a comprehensive 
narrative, or still less analysis, of the student 
movement as a whole. 
A Supportive Structure 
-The student protest of 1989 was in many ways 
a tactical triumph. It did not produce the 
outpouring of new ideas, the creation- of 
newspapers and journals, or the level of 
reflective thought that had been part of the 
democracy wall movement of 1979-80. It did 
give rise to a number of innovations in struggle 
itself and to the largest popular mobilization· 
independent of the government that the Peo-
ple's Republic has ever seen. 
From the beginning, the "Beijing Spring" of 
1989 bore testimony to the fact that even a 
relatively ·spontaneous movement depends upon 
organization. Neither feature necessarily con-
tradicts the other. This is partly because 
spontaneity is not always a radically individual 
phenomenon .. some of the current Western-
influenced ideology of Chinese youth notwith-
standing. Their spontaneous participation was 
nurtured in group discussions. They came 
forward organized by schools and within 
schools by classes. Small clusters of friends 
and classmates had discussed their complaints 
about the government and the state of Chinese 
culture for months; they h·ad debated various 
.ideas in the privacy of dormitory rooms and in 
semi-public ·gatherings at restaurants and cam-
pus hangouts. Indeed, one of the striking 
features of the protest movement from the very 
beginning was its ability to generate organiza-
tion without requiring much bureaucratic appa-
ratus or formal hierarchy. 
At many levels. this ubiquity of organization 
was an achievement of Chinese Communism; 
every class had its monitor, for example, and 
they were as prepared to organize food for 
hunger strikers as circulation of course materi-
als. Traditional Chinese culture also encour~ 
aged this s.ense of the primacy of the group. 
But at its base in 1989 was a more novel 
feature that helped t0 change the meaning of 
the whole process of solidarity. This was a 
strong ideology and actuality of friendship. 
Personal ties among individuals, created volun-
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tarily rather than by the sys~em, were highly 
valued and emotionally charged. Students 
debated, for e?'ample, whether the friendship 
bond~something perhaps closer to the stron-
gest senses of Australian mateship than to the 
usual American sense of the word-should take 
primacy over marriage. They stressed high 
ideals of loyalty. They shared everything. 
Students well aware that the black-market rate 
for foreign exchange. was some 50 percent 
above the official rate nonetheless exchanged 
money among friends at face value-even 
though foreign exchange was an extremely 
prized commodity for those who hoped to go 
abroad since everything from tests to applica-
tion fees had to be paid for in foreign exchange 
certificates. One student 1 knew, eventually a 
minor. leader in the protest, housed a friend in 
his dormitory room, even providing money for 
his friend~s meals out of his own meager 
income (a standard tiny stipend augmented by 
teaching- English to students preparing for 
exams). The friend was a graduate student at 
another university, but came to think of himself 
as a "professional revolutionary." 
The institution of friendship had not always 
overridden ascribed group membership-
kinship, danwei (work unit), class-in China. 
Previous policies of the Communist regime had 
in many ways specifically undermined it, 
calling for a commitment to ideology and party 
above such personal ties, creating powerful 
ritual occasions for friends and relatives to 
betray and criticize each other. Friendship, and 
also kinship· and other directly interpersonal 
relationships, seemed of central importance to 
students' lives. Yet they are poorly grasped by 
either the notions of individualism or the 
equation of society with the large collectivity 
and/or the state. Students identified strongly 
with various bits of individualistic ideology, 
from Western writings on capitalism and 
freedom to the simple idea of the primacy of 
romantic self-expression (personified in China 
by the poet Xu Zhimo). A vaguely Rousseauian 
(or Californian) idea of the ultimate value of 
expressing one's internal feelings was very 
widely shared. The government's common 
taunt of "bourgeois individualism" seemed to 
Balling Spring 
hit it rather accurately. But the strong feeling 
for friendship, practiced with a level of loyalty 
that put most Westerners to shame, was not 
individualistic. It was truly social. I wondered 
how many students thought about whether their 
own espousal of individualism might be at odds 
with this other fundamental value. In any case, 
the resurgence of friendship was one of the 
most basic manifestations of the emergence of 
society beyond the reach of the state, and thus 
of a capacity for genuine insurgency and an 
independent public sphere. 
One could see other manifestations of the 
development of. "civil society'" perhaps most 
notably the growing numbers of s·mall entrepre· 
neurs. Many of these were merchants. Some 
were to be found filling every free market (and 
lining quite a few sidewaiks), their capital 
limited to the merchandise they could fit on a 
single table or the back of a pedicab-pots and 
pans, books and magazines, belts, bicycle 
bells, or ·postcards. A few of these getihu 
(small entrepreneurs) came to be owners of 
substantial businesses, operating a chain of 
market stalls, for example, or entering the 
wholesale trade. Some other kinds of enter-
prises contributed more directly to the begin· 
nings of a public sphere in Chinese cities. 
Restaurants, for example, flourished at all 
price levels, bringing a range of regional 
cuisines into Beijing and providing at least 
partially free public spaces. Some of these were 
operated on university campuses, using leased 
buildings. Perhaps not surprisingly. they of· 
fered the best, though not the cheapest, food on 
campus. Others, often much smaller, were 
located nearby, providing at four or five tables 
the opportunity for free discussion over Xin-
jiang noodles or Szechuan soups. Of course 
still others catered to a more upscale clientele 
of businesspeople, party officials, and foreign· 
ers, and charged prices which meant that most 
students would never see the inside of them. 
Owners of all these sorts of businesses 
contributed money to the protest movement; 
many joined in the marches of late May. 
The .spread of a private market in publica- . 
tions was a powerful direct influence on the 
rise of dissenting, pluralist thought. Gradually, 
since the early 1980s, independent booksellers 
had carved a major niche for themselves in 
China's intellectual life. To be sure, their most 
popular publications were sex manuals and 
salacious or gory novels. On the same tables, 
however, one could sometimes find such 
foreign works as Freud's New Introductory 
Lectures, C. Wright Mills's The Power Elite, 
or Locke's Second Treatise. One could also 
find, in between the government'~ periodic 
efforts to purge the market of counterrevolution-
ary materials, the publications of Chinese 
thinkers grappling with questions of national 
identity, the problems of bureaucratization, and 
the possible virtues of stock markets and 
private ownership of industry. The most 
influential works . were probably works of 
fiction, a genre (or set of genres, from satire to 
realism) well·suited t.o raising controversial 
questions in less ·than explicit forms, posing 
problems without having to advocate solutions 
that might be at variance with party policy, 
giving expression to individual feelings and 
thus encouraging the idea of their primacy. 
Various journals made a similar impact, both 
introducing Western ideas (in translation and 
summary or commentary fonn) and providing 
for an -independent Chinese discourse. Those 
that were too independent were often short-
lived. flowering mainly during such periods of 
democratic activity and apparent government 
openness as the 1979-80 democracy move· 
ment. They were especially likely to be 
suppressed, or _to fail of their own internal 
problems, if they were published without 
institutional sponsorship and/or aimed at a 
relatively broad readership. Academic periodi· 
cals, on the other hand, were more stable. 
Though their openness to free expression 
varied with· the political climate, they contin-
ued to publish discussions of new and often 
controversial ideas fairly continuously through 
the 1980s. Journals of philosophy called tenets 
of official Marxism into question. encouraging 
a flowering of interest in Western Marxists and 
critical theory. Sociological publications exam-
ined stratification in Chinese society. Perhaps 
the most influential were literary journals. 
These not only reinforced the influence of some 
fiction writers •. they sponsored a discourse on 
Chinese culture. This was a discourse heavily 
influenced (in its more academic versions) by 
Western postmodemists, ~hetoricians, and new 
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wave literary scholars; Jacques Derrida, Wayne 
Booth, . and Frederic Jameson all had Chinese 
fans, though based generally on a fairly 
fragmentary understanding of their French or 
English works and especialiy of their discursive 
contexts. 
At the same time that it sought currency by 
international standards (or almost patholo~i­
cally _pursued Western trendiness), however, 
this discourse also sometimes found new 
inspiration in older (but for the most part still 
modem) Chinese writings, -most especially 
those of Laing Qichao, Lu Xun and the 
protagonists ·of the May 4th movement. It 
addressed in original and important ways the 
problem of how Chinese culture-traditional 
and Communist-would fare in the twenty-first 
centucy. What were the cultural implications of 
importing Western technology? Was China's 
generally postulated .economic and political 
backwardness due _to fundamental cultural 
weaknesses? How would Chinese culture have 
to be strengthened (echoing Kang Y ouwei and 
the self-strengtheners of 1895) to provide for 
modernization, perhaps including democracy? 
These-questions were not always posed straight-
forwardly, but they were debated by readers. 
, P erhap~ the most striking semi popular mani-
festation of this was the- television series River 
Elegy, shown in the fall of 1988. This was 
produced by a group of well-educated young 
men, heavily influenced by this literary-cultural 
discourse. They took their occasion and a good 
bit of their footage from a Japanese-produced 
travelogue about the Yellow River. Adding 
their own commentary and a wide variety of 
archival footage, however, they transformed 
the genre of travelogue into a critical cultural 
analysis. The Yellow River is traditionally seen 
as the heart and source of Chinese life. They 
portrayed it as the focus of an inward-looking 
culture, characterized by mud and soil erosion, 
disastrous floods, and unfortunate human 
interventions. A dominant motif was the 
challenge posed when the Yellow River met the 
blue sea; striking aerial cinematography im-
printed this visually into the viewers' minds. 
Chinese culture was compared to that of 
"primitive" Africa-a shocking statement for 
438 • DISSENT 
proud and racist Chinese. The heritage of four 
thousand years of civilization was shown as 
more a trap than a resource. Mao Zedong was 
pictured facing the Yellow River but silent; this 
man who always had so much to say was quiet 
before the problems it po~ed. 
River Elegy was also technically sophisti-
cated by Chinese standards. It worked mainly 
through montage, with extremely rapid cuts 
from scene to scene (influenced I suspect by 
Hong Kong film fashions and reminiscent of 
recent trends in American television advertise-
ments and music videos). In the space of a 
minute, a viewer might see Mao, the river, the 
Egyptian pyramids, the Great Wall, and a rally 
of the People's Liberation Army. Intentionally, 
it purveyed more information than any viewer 
could take in at one showing, and especially 
more than he or she could assimilate within 
received categories. It left the viewer with a 
welter of unresolved impressions. The voice-
over provided only a partial framework for 
understanding. The film's real message was 
left just below the explicit, and heavily 
dependent on the visuals. 
The film attracted a remarkably large 
audience on Chinese television, and was shown 
a second time before the authorities had second 
thoughts about allowing it to be shown at all. It 
also sparked a wide discussion among viewers. 
This reveals, first of all, that a much larger 
public than university-trained intellectuals was 
prepared to engage in a critical discourse about 
Chinese culture and China's future (though 
surely many found the film's more unkind 
comparisons and evaluations shocking,· even 
offensive). In addition, the episode reveals that 
the government was not united in its stance on 
either Chinese culture or the limits of permissi~ 
ble public expression. The film could only have 
been made with the backing of fairly powerful 
figures, and its repeated showings indicated 
their strong support. A genuine liberalization in 
public expression helped to pave the way for 
the protest movement of Spring 1989. On the 
other hand, River Elegy's third broadcast was 
stopped (as was a film planned by the same 
group on the May 4th movement). 
River Elegy's popularity dramatized the 
centrality of the problem of culture for 
thoughtful Chinese in the late 1980s. Few 
Bellina Spring 
doubted the desirability of economic "modern-
ization," though what form it should take was 
debated. But how was economic change to 
relate to culture? What did it mean to be 
Chinese in a world of computers and FAX 
machines, tourists and joint ventures, the 
internationalization of commodity flows and 
culture? Maoist Communism had offered an 
alternative source of pride and a version of 
national identity (incorporating some aspects of 
tradition while rejecting others). What elements 
of Maoism or Confucianism could provide a 
vision for the future? Or had both decisively 
failed the tests of modernity? Did that mean 
wholesale Westernization or were there siUI the 
resources for an authentic Chinese path? In 
short, all but the most technocratic or cautious 
and party-loyal Chinese intellectuals, and a 
good many others besides, felt that China's 
modernization was in need of a cultural vision. 
However real the economic gains might be, 
they were either in jeopardy or even pernicious 
if not accompanied by a sound vision of 
Chinese society and culture. 
T~s was the point where most students a~d 
·intellectuals thought they had a crucial role to 
play. Some were primarily trained to play 
-technical ~les in modernization, as engineers, 
doctors, or demographers. Even they might 
have worries about vision. For humanists and 
the more culturally oriented. of social scientists 
these worries were much more acute. And they 
were coupled with a sense that the government 
lacked respect for them and failed to provide 
for their role in China's modernization. Not all 
of these students had a strongly political con-
ception of what to do, of how far an insurrection 
could go, of what role the Communist party 
might play or whether multiparty elections were 
possible or good, or of what form decentraliza-
-tion of ·bureaucratic power should take. But the 
political ideas of nearly all the active leaders, as 
well as the sentiments of more "rank-and-file" 
participants in the protest, were deeply shaped 
by this sense of cultural crisis and impoverish-
ment. It was at the heart of the students' talk of 
democracy, at least as centrally as any imported 
Western specifics about the mechanics ofliberal 
democratic rule. 
These ideas and this sense of crisis had been 
so widely disseminated before the protest 
movement actually got going in April that they 
could be taken for granted among the core of 
student participants. This was simultaneously a 
strength and a weakness. It helped to make the 
substantial early mobilization possible. It also 
impeded the development of both the ability to 
• 
spread the movement's message beyond its 
original student base and internal discourse 
about goals, methods, and priorities. This 
cultural concern informed both the -students' 
initial very moderate message-essentially "take 
us and our ideas seriously, give us a voice"-
and their subsequent determination to persist, 
as government recalcitrance made their move-
ment more radical. 
An 0 pportunity for Prot.est 
The immediate occasion for protest was the 
death of Hu Yaobang. Though some Chinese 
students, especially in the United -States, have 
since suggested that this was a deep, s_pontane-
ous, and heartfelt outpouring of sadness over a 
.beloved leader, I think some skepticism is in 
order. Hu was indeed a relative liberal, but 
more important he was a symbol of the party's 
repression of political reform and. his ·death a 
pretext for demanding more such reform. Hu, 
after all, had been no great advocate of .free 
speech as head of the propaganda ministry, and 
he was ousted as party chief less for befriend· 
ing students than for failing to coiuain their 
prodemocratic protests. 
Hu's death, however, provided the students 
with a splendid opportunity and. they made the 
most of it. It would be awkward if not 
impossible, they knew, for the government 
completely to forbid mourning the death-of a 
sitting Politburo member who was also a past 
General Secretary of the Communist party. 
Activists decided to see how far they could 
stretch official tolerance. Their calls for 
demonstrations drew thousands of students 
canying photographs of Hu and wearing· signs 
of mourning. The· government recognized the 
implicit protest but apparently decided.to try to 
appease the students or demonstrate . its toler-
ance by allowing them to carry on. ·· Unap-
peased, the students added broader slogans to 
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the signs of mourning and their numbers grew. 
Every Chinese observer read clearly the echoes 
of the · public demonstrations that followed 
Zhou Enlai's death in 1976 and. produced the 
notorious Tiananmen incident (the repression 
of the protest that created popular martyrs and 
was a key moment in the fall of the Gang of 
Four and return of Deng Xiaoping). The 
potential potency of such protests was thus 
unquestioned. 
Hu Y aobang also provided a powerful, 
multivocal symbol. He was not only a liberal, 
but a clear Westernizer who had made a stir 
while I was in China in 1984 by (apparently 
impulsively) suggesting that chopsticks should 
be abandoned for forks. He was also Deng 
Xiaoping's personally picked and publicly 
designated successor. Deng had made provid-
ing for an orderly succession one of the 
centerpieces of his reform campaign. The 
sacking of Hu thus suggested that China had 
not shaken its "feudal" tradition of rule as fully 
as Deng claimed. Hu was a sponsor as well as 
a predecessor of Zhao Ziyang, the current party 
chief. Hu died during a Politburo meeting, 
apparently suffering a heart attack. This 
allowed for discreet rumors that he had either 
been humiliated by his colleagues or shocked 
by some action they contemplated. 
~ late April. after ne~ly two weeks of 
protest in the guise of mourning, senior 
officials began to lose patience with the 
students. Crowds now numbered in the tens of 
thousands and the use of Hu's death as pretext 
was wearing thin. · A number of students 
thought the government would probably wait 
until after the end of the official month of 
mourning to ban further marches. In fact, those 
cadres who had already had enough apparently 
gained the upper hand and secured Deng's 
approval for a crackdown on April 25. This 
resulted in the now-infamous People's Daily 
editorial of April 26 which warned students 
none too delicately to stop creating disorder; 
the editorial implied that the government was 
ready to use military force (though as soon as it 
was published a variety of senior leaders 
including Zhou Enlai's widow were said to 
begin lobbying for more restraint). 
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Far from calling their protests off, students 
drew new fervor from the government's 
condemnation, seeing it as provocation rather 
than warning. They were particularly incensed 
that ·their own patriotic inclinations had been 
called into doubt, that they were being -labeled 
troublemakers rather than-good citizens-exercis-
ing their constitutionally -guaranteed rights of 
remonstration and free speech. Student leaders 
feared the worst, however, and several melo-
dramatically made wills the night of A-pril 26. 
The next morning, they were joined by the 
largest crowd yet, perhaps a quarter of a 
million people (though estimates vary widely 
and extend up to more than half a· million). 
There are at most about 160~000- -university 
students in Beijing, so any numbers beyond 
that suggest substantial participation from other 
groups-teachers. secondary school students, 
and the general public. 
The march of Aprit 2:7 was::one.-of _the most 
remarkable successes in China or elsewhere, 
and one of the most striking ·cases of bad 
government tactics I know of. As the coluiilll 
of marchers approached Tiananmen Square 
along several routes they met large .contingents 
of military police. Anxiety grew amid the sense 
that the government meant to crush them. On 
Chang'an Bouievard, the immediate approach 
to the Square, protesters confronted blockades 
of policemen, apparently intendinglo halt the 
march. But the -policemen were unarmed, and 
stood only a few rows deep against the massive 
crowd. They attempted briefly to hold their 
ground then gave way; a few scuffles followed. 
The crowd cheered as marchers pushed through. 
To compound ·,its apparent madness, the 
government had arrayed several such police 
blockades a few hundred meters apart along the 
boulevard. The students pierced each one 
easily, and each time their confidence and 
enthusiasm grew. The government's intention 
may have been to provide a symbolic warning 
that the protesters were breaking the law. They 
ended up giving the students the feeling of 
having won a victory against the military! 
As Chinese protesters have done at least 
since 1919, the students marched in rows with 
arms linked. But this time they added another 
bit of organization. Students around the 
perimeter of each group also linked their arms, 
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providing a neat definition to each marching 
unit-class, school, and so on-and simulta-
neously keeping out agents provocateurs. This 
was not a trivial issue, because disorder of any 
type would delegitimate the students' cause in 
the eyes of the public. The government was apt 
not only to call the protesters hooligans but to 
employ some real hooligans to lend credence to 
the charge. This seemed to have happened only 
days before in Xian where a protest was marred 
by a small rampage of attacks on property. 
The April 27 march galvanized popular 
attention and brought the first phase of student 
protest to its climax. This was no longer a 
protest confmed narrowly to university stu-
dents, nor could it rest any more on_ the pretext 
of mourning Hu Y aobang:.. It had taken on an 
autonomous significance. And the- attention it. 
galvanized was not limited to Beijing or even 
to China. From this point on, the-protest began 
to be echoed in a growing__number -of other 
Chinese cities. Within a: week, the first_ of 
eventually enormous contingents of students 
from around the country began to come to 
Beijing to jpin the protest. And the ApnT 27 
march made front page and-first itemtelevision 
news around the world. The students-were well-
aware- of this international interest -amf -had 
organized specifically to tum it- ·to their 
advantage. They carried signs in .English, 
French, and other Western languages. "Vive Ia 
liberte" and "Give me liberty or give me 
death" established links tO the year's tWO 
famous bicentennials (albeit loosely in the 
second case, since the reference was re-volution-
my and not constitutional). They also, and 
perhaps more important, gave foreign photog-
raphers shots that were more likely to hold the 
attention of folks back home than were signs in 
Chinese. At' this point too, at least some 
student leaders began to become much more 
visible in the press, precisely because- they 
made themselves accessible to the press. Thus 
Wu'erkaixi's dormitory room at Beijing Nor-
mal University became a regular stop for 
journalists. But at the same time a few leaders 
from smaller schools-'l.ncluding the very 
active University of Politics and La.w_-began 
to. chafe a little at the appropriation of this 
aspect of the leadership role by leaders at 
Beijing Normal and Beijing Universities. 
The next big event was a march on May 4, 
the anniversary of the 1919 student movement. 
Though the government again brought out the 
military police, this time it had them discreetly 
withdraw to the sides of the streets rather than 
challenge the students directly. Deprived of the 
drama of breaking through police lines, the 
occasion was curiously anticlimactic. The 
demonstration was as large as on April 27, and 
the crowd of bystanders larger, but there was 
no tension and there were no events, music, or 
even major speeches to hold people's attention 
once they made it to Tiananmen Square. For a 
week afterward, students watched the protests 
dwindle as they waited to see what response the 
government would make to their demands. 
Most returned briefly to classes. The protest 
was a constant topic of discussion on cam-
puses, but no one seemed to know what the 
next move was. 
Leadership 
The next move was unclear for three main 
reasons. First, the protest had moved beyond 
the range of lessons available from experience. 
Although protesters had posed implicit chal-
lenges to the government before, none had ever 
acted against direct instructions-backed appar-
ently by military force-and gotten away with 
it. Students talked frequently with teachers and 
others who remembered earlier movements and 
who had thought at length about possible 
courses of action; they gave advice, but this 
mobilization escaped both their expectations 
and experience. Second, it was not clear what 
the government was going to do. The possibil-
ities the students saw ranged from harsh 
crackdown to taking the students seriously and 
massively accelerating reform. Uncertainty 
about the government's actions stemmed from 
lack of knowledge of which ·factions in the 
government were in the ascendant, though 
most students did not yet know just how deeply 
divided the government was. It seems that 
some partisans of the reform faction may have 
talked with student leaders, or infonned them 
of their views indirectly through senior intellec-
tuals (and on the other side, Li Peng met with 
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senior professors _ . to,. try to get them to 
encourage calm and faith in the government on 
campuses). But though this may have affected 
actions at various points it does not seem to 
have been extensive enough to say that the 
movement was either substantially encouraged 
by any party faction or helped :by access to 
much significant inside information-. Third, the 
student leadership was itself both somewhat 
amorphous and unable to make .and communi-
cate decisions except by word of mouth and 
dazibao (large character posters). 
Sudents had initially become leaders primar-
ily by leading. That is, there was no prior stage· 
of selection, a procedure by which individuals 
became officially sanctioned-leaders. On a few 
occasions formal elections were held. but they 
were not the primary source of .authority for 
leaders. Most were after-the-Tact ratifications 
of -leaders who had- emerged in the :course of 
practical activity. Some involved more or less 
fanciful positions-like- the election,of -Beijing 
Normal University student Chai Ling as 
"Commander of 'riananmen- Square ... ' In the 
case of this election as of most -others in China 
(whether as part of -goyernment officialdom or 
in a protest movement) the outcome was not in 
doubt when the voting took place; :the vote-
count ratified a decision that _ had already 
· become more or less consensual. And being 
nominal "Commander" for a moment gave 
Chai Ling little opportunity to command, for 
the movement was not organized in a hierarchy 
of ranks. 
· Not only were leaders less official than 
Western media reports have frequently sug-
gested, leadership was spread much more 
widely through the movement. Many different 
groups of students made innovations in protest 
simply by deciding that some particular slogan 
or line of action was a good idea and then 
putting it into practice. Others might copy or 
not. Important decisions were often taken by 
small groups; they did not all percolate up from 
the "masses.'' But the small groups were not 
always identical to or part of a centralized 
leadership. It is important to realize how 
rapidly the movement developed from bases on 
campuses of about ten thousand or fewer 
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students to include hundreds of thousands of 
participants coming from various backgrounds 
with varying degrees of knowledge and com-
mitment. The level of organization achieved 
was quite remarkable. Marches were orderly, 
not rag-tag affairs; in mid-May. there was _a 
notable increase in pageantry, with new 
banners and· flags and matching T -shirts for a 
few groups. Jn the Square itself :crowds were 
orderly, there was virtually no crime, hea1th 
services were set up and -when it became 
necessary. paths were made for ambulances. A 
system of passes was devised and enforced 
fairly effectively by student guards; But though 
-linked, leadership and organization are not 
exactly the same. A lot of this organization 
came through the borrowing of templates from 
other settings (as with the role .of class 
monitors) -and· from lateral interactions among 
_gro~ps·. Only a portion was centrally initiated. 
As time went .. on, however..-1eadership-becarne 
simultaneously more important and· .. harder .to 
organize and provide. 
In late May, for example-, leaders .. tried 
repeatedly to move slogans from. an: almost 
exclusive preoccupation with-persons-"Down 
with Li Peng,'' "Deng Xiaoping::step down"-
to a renewed emphasis .Ofl' democracy as :SUCh 
and other systemic changes. They failed. The 
earlier emphasis on systemic rather ·than-
personnel ·changes in government was all but 
lost as the movement broadened, anger grew, 
and confrontation intensified'.* At the ·same 
*An aspect of this that struck me especially forcefully was 
the students• refusal to use Marxist and/or Maoist rhetoric 
in any of their slogans. Even students who did use- some 
Marxist categories in their analyses .during small group 
discussions, and who might acknowledge abstractly the 
rhetorical force o·f using the government's own language 
against it, never made any effort to develop this ·in their 
public pronouncements. Whether this was simply because 
Marxism had been made boring by mandatory political 
study classes taught from translated Soviet manuals, or 
because it had been deradicalized by its use as an official 
ideology, or because it had been more deeply discredited 
by its role in Maoist rule I was never certain. But protesters 
did not accuse elites of class rule. Students who in the 
classroom were keen to discuss Marx's writings on 
alienation (and who regarded the government's dismissal of 
these "immature works" as merely an attempt to avoid the 
charge that alienation continued under socialism) did not 
use this language in movement gatherings. In this, the 1989 
protesters differed substantially from those of 1979-80 
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time that such ideological leadership was 
relatively ineffective, organization remained 
fairly strong. There was a crisis over managing 
and accounting for donations from abroad, but 
considering the pressure students were under, 
the fact that they could not even open a bank 
account, and that the sums were huge by the 
standards of their daily lives, this was minor. 
Supplies that arrived were circulated effec-
t'ively. Tents from Hong Kongwere distributed 
and arranged in orderly ranks. -Couriers main-
tained contacts between students in the Square 
and their home campuses. Loudspeakers were 
set up. Troop ·movements were-monitored. 
.There were two great triumphs of inspira-
tional leadership. The first was the decision of 
May 12 to begin a ·hunger _strike; the second 
was that which_ resulted in the erection of the 
statue of the "Goddess of Democracy" exactly 
two weeks later. Each involved an interaction 
between (a) a widespread sense that _something 
needed to be done, (b) initiative from some 
particular individuals and/or small groups, and 
(c) a sort of ratification by the core leadership 
of the. movement. In the case of ·the hunger 
strike, the initiating and ratifying groups were 
more closely linked, indeed· heavily overlap-
ping at the major universities-Beijing., Beijing 
Normal, People's, and Qinghua. With regard. 
to the statue, however,. the"key .role was·played 
by students at the Central Academy- of Fine 
Arts, people for the most ~part outside the 
"established" core of student leadership. 
Both the hunger strike and the statue, 
however, were successful symbolic acts. They 
bolstered the enthusiasm and commitment of 
student activists when these were flagging, and 
they communicated about the movement to 
far-flung audiences. Each- brought a new period 
of exhilaration to a movement .that swung 
rapidly between emotional highs and lows. 
The hunger strike was the more important, 
though the statue became an enduring symbol. 
who made considerable use of Marxist texts, including 
Marx's writings on the Paris Commune, as a basis for 
conceptualizing democracy. Perhaps !he most imponant 
reason was simply the much readier availability of other 
languages of discourse after a decade of Western influence 
and internal reform. 
Several tactical considerations guided the 
hunger strike, though it also followed some 
historical examples and was based in emotional 
expression. Most obviously, perhaps, those 
who planned the hunger strike were well aware 
of the impending visit of Soviet Premier 
Gorbachev. Not only would his visit inhibit the 
Chinese government from taking overt repres-
sive action, it would bring an even larger flock 
of international reporters and focus more media 
attention on China. The protesterst message 
would be beard (and seen) more widely, and 
that itself would have an impact, perhaps, on 
the Chinese regime. ·But the students had to 
offer the reporters newsworthy events; the 
hunger strike provided both a focus of attention 
and numerous concrete events and photo 
opportunities as students collapsed and were 
carried unconscious· to hospitals while others 
rallied to their support. And -it was- during the 
hunger strike that the largest of all the protest 
marches was held. More than a million. people 
converged on Tiananmen Square on May 17. 
The impact of sheer:,scale was multiplied by the 
diversity of .banners -proclaiming the different 
units in attendance or·offering-witty or piercing 
slogans. And the marchers -wore a rainbow of 
colors, one of .the most. visible signs of the 
freedom people felt in -the .midst of this brief 
relaxation of government control .. being a 
delight in more expressive clothing. 
The hunger strike also aroused enormous 
sympathy on the part of ordinary people who 
heard of it. This meant at- ·teast most of the 
residents of China'sJargercities and probably a 
fair part of the rest of the country. Scenes from 
the hunger strike -were broadcast on Chinese 
Central Television and printed in People's 
Daily, but it cannot simply- be assumed that 
these sources reached the whole of their routine 
audiences throughout the country. Constant 
reporting was also ·beamed ·back via. the BBC 
and Voice of America, both of which can be 
heard widely in China (although the govern· 
ment jammed ·them with· at least middling 
efficacy for some of·this time). 
Ordinary people felt drawn to and protective 
of the hunger strikers; they were prepared to 
see the .latter as suffering on their behalf. This 
was partly because they were moved by the 
spectacle of relatively privileged university 
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students worrying not only about their personal 
careers but about China's future, putting their 
health, future prospects, and possibly lives at 
risk. It. :was also because they could identify 
readily,with some·of the students' complaints-
notably .about corruption. And while political· 
democracy was apparently a less pressing 
concern outside intellectual ranks, other-people 
were prepared lo see the student protest as 
speaking also-for their more_ economic anxieties 
and demands. 
The hunger strike quickly turned into an 
occupation of Tiananmen Squ·are-. This ulti-
mately became--problematic. as -student leaders 
found that they could not end the occupation in-
a way~that saved face, satisfied the full range of 
participants, and still avoided an intolerable 
-confrontation-with the government_ But at the 
start:it;was.'a fme tactical move~ Aside from the 
strike~s- successful communication to the Chi-
llese people and abroad, the· occupation of 
Tiananmen :Sguare..gave the movement a focal 
i>oint. This w.as important not just for those 
·reporting on it from outside but for the 
protesters themselves. Previously there had. 
been no "neutral" turf on which activists from 
all the different universities gathered to discuss 
their plans and ideas. Now the Square became 
not .only a symbol of success and an object of 
defense, ·it became the scene of nightly 
meetings ofthe student leadership. 
Occupying the Square 
On May 22, l sat in Tiananmen Square with a 
group of the occupying students. The sun was-
mercilessly hot and the pavement absorbed the 
heat and radiated it back at us. The Square had 
been occupied for ten days, and garbage· 
disposal was a problem (though students 
worked hard to keep it under control). Banners 
that had been bright and fresh a week before 
were a little bedraggled. So were the students. 
On the other hand, the chronic water shortage 
was lessening. Pedicabs were wheeled around 
the Square with barrels on the back; protesters 
came and filled their own bottles. usually one-
or two-liter plastic drink bottles of a sort that 
had only arrived in China during the last five 
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years: Merchants we~ :now donating food in 
more than ample supplies. ·I ate steamed rolls 
with my student friends and then shared their 
disappointment when a more tempting meal- of 
sliced pork. over rice arrived, just after we had 
taken the edge off our appetites. The -pork 
dishes came in styrofoam containers, just as 
·they -might from any Chinese take-out restau-
rant· in the United States, fifty at a time. Only 
three days before~ many of these same students 
-had ended a week-long hunger strike. One had 
made six round-trips to a hospital to be revived 
by intravenous drip and back to the Square to 
continue his fast. 
Now he ate well, but talked of disarray and 
discouragement in the leadership. The previous 
day had seen crisis at the top, even while the 
"broad: masses" .of students were still savoring 
the support ofBeijing's-ordinary people and the 
:government's inability to impose martial law. 
The three most prominent leaders, Wu'erkaixi, 
Wang Dan, and Chai Ling, had differences of 
their own (notably a clash of male egos 
·between the first two) but had agreed tbat it 
was time -to -call for a withdrawal from 
Ttananmen Square. From the massive and· 
-festi-ve May 4-demonstration, just a week after 
the April 27- triumph, to just before the 
massacre a month -later, students occasionally 
suggested, "It's time to consolidate our gains; 
l~s- declare victory and return to classes." 
They didn't mean to give up, ofcourse, only to 
step back from the most provocative tactics, 
-and to put the ball in the government's court for 
a response to the democratic challenge. 
At first this suggestion came mainly from 
older graduate students, somewhat less radical 
and more cautious in their overall approach. By 
the end of May, it had been voiced by key 
leaders of the student. movement. Some thought 
a declaration of victory and organized with-
drawal would bolster Communist party General 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang • s chances to stay in 
power, and thus enhance the forces of liberal 
reform. Others worried that if the occupation 
were too prolonged, crowds would grow 
smaller and the movement would look gradu-
ally weaker. Still others simply wanted to avoid 
violent repression. By June 4 it looked like the 
last argument. at least, had had significant 
merits. 
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Nonetheless, in the May 21 midnight caucus 
of the leadership, the leaders sharing this view 
were outvoted by a substantial majority. 
Wu'erkaixi had retreated to collect his thoughts 
and recover his strength. Wang Dan sat for 
hours with his head in his hands, sometimes 
crying in frustration. The problem was not just 
that the occupying students were not following 
his leadership but that there was no coherent 
alternative. The decision had been made, it 
seemed, to stay in the Square. But there was no 
alternative organization to that which seemed 
to be losin_g its efficacy and no particular plan 
about what .to do while the occupation was 
continued. 
What would the American Students for -a 
.Qemocratic Seciety have done under similar 
circumstances, asked my friend, the main 
student leader ·of one of the smaller ·but 
prestigious Beijing universities? I wasn't sure, 
I said. In retrospect, however, it seems-to me 
that-the SDS quite likely would have done, and 
over the -long run did do, pretty much the~same 
thing. Though comparisons with the Western 
student movement of the 1960s were often 
misleading about the Chinese students' strug-
gles in 1989, there was a striking similarity 
·here. The SDS (and more generally ,the 
leadership of the sixties struggles) dissolved in 
factional fighting (even before one faction 
launched a takeover) and lost its ability to. lead 
a movement that .had grown rapidly both 
beyond the core that had been a part of the long 
discussions reading up to it, and beyond the 
movement's organizational capacity. So too in 
Beijing. There were clashes of egos and 
ideologies among the leaders. Protesters who 
came from outside of Beijing now rivalled and 
would soon pass the numbers of those from the 
capital's universities. Those who came later 
often felt a need to demonstrate their own 
commitment to the struggle by taking stronger 
positions or engaging in more extreme tactics 
than those who began the fight. At the same 
time, their understanding of the slogans and 
goals that guided the movement was often 
fuzzier and shallower. 
At various points, some· students tried to 
push the movement ahead by more radical 
measures. The most striking of these was the 
declaration of a handful of hunger strikers that 
they planned to bum themselves to death if the 
·government did not meet key student demands. 
This threat was made repeatedly during the 
week after May 13. On at least one occasion 
the would-be martyrs got so far as dousing 
themselves with kerosene before they were 
prevented by other protesters from completing 
their threatened immolation. 
This incident made me think of the com-
ments_ Lu Xun (China's greatest modem 
writer) made on the death of Qiu Jin some 
eighty y.ears before. Qiu Jin had been one 
of :the first women to rise to importance 
among China's radical modernizers, and had 
·studied,·in Japan at the same time as Lu Xun. 
There she had developed a reputation as a fiery 
orator and drew large and admiring crowds . 
Her fame· continued to grow when she returned 
to ~.china. She played a key role in building .a 
school and joined with her lover and- others in 
planriing -an insurrection .. Eventually their plot 
was::uncovered. She was warned by .friends=that 
the. ,army was coming for her but chose to 
remain at her school, hoping to, make· a 
dramatic last stand with the anns which had 
been stockpiled·_ there. She was c~tured and 
ultimately beheaded. ·Lu-Xun wrote, ho.wever, 
that she had ·been "clapped" -to death. In other 
words, the crowds that had· urged on her 
speeches and.applauded:her protestations: against 
.the government had. implicitly pushed her to 
ever more radical positions. She could neither 
pause-to consolidate her gains nor escape when 
the troops came without humiliation_ and 
betrayal· of her own sense of direction. The 
complicity of the crowd in her death went 
further. Their applause was not just the product 
of agreement with. her complaints, but of a 
pleasure· in the entertainment her protest 
provided. A crowd would also gawk at her 
execution . 
. Soc too in- the "Beijing Spring" of 1989 and 
in varying degrees-so too always. A crowd of 
a quarter of a million people is impressive 
when· observers and participants expected· -only 
a hundred thousand. But it quickly establishes a 
new norm. To maintain a sense of momentum, 
to remain newsworthy, activists must increase 
the numbers in the crowd. Or they must do 
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something more dramatic than merely march-
ing~ Attention will always be focused on the 
apparent leaders-and the core activists, but the 
crowd on .the fringes shares implicitly -in 
responsibility for the actions taken. Those who 
cheer encourage those who demonstrate. Those 
who merely watch still swell-the crowd counts. 
Simply by attending, every one of us, Chinese 
or foreign, upped· the ante for the protesting 
students. 
So, almost invisibly, the stakes kept being 
raised throughout the month of May and the 
-first two days of June~ The government tried 
concessions. State :council spokesman Yuan 
Mu, for example,. met with some students for a 
televised dialogue. It was not-open enough and 
be was not senior enough (or forthcoming 
enough) to satisfy many people. lt encouraged 
further action, ·however. not just -by failing to 
satisfy but by seeming to prove that protest 
-could bring results. The- government tried 
condemnation -and- the imposition of martial 
law. -u Peng' s .speeeh declarit1g martial law 
was like gasoline on a fire; students who 
previously were unsure of how far to go or 
whether some moderation m~ght bolster the 
cause of reform:immediately took to the streets, 
insulted by his tone -and -angered- by his denial 
-of everything~they-called for. And of course the 
imposition- of martial law failed, at least for 
two weeks, with .troops stallea:on the periphery 
of Beijing. The soWiers' inability or unwilling-
ness to enforce martial law was widely felt as 
another triumph~ But just as it.prevented short 
term repression itTaised the stakes of action yet 
again. However orderly they might be, the 
students and their allies among the citizens of 
Beijing were now engaged in what the 
government would clearly see as a sort of 
illegal occupation of the city. 
The flow of students from outside of Beijing 
into Tiananmen Square contributed to a sort of 
radicalization in a different way. These stu-
dents had started coming in large numbers and 
to stay for an extended period of time shortly 
-after the hunger strike began. They established 
camps under the banners of their various 
schools. They had not been involved in the 
early stages of protest, and so may have felt an 
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extra need to prove their commitment to the 
cause, to match or top the actions taken by the 
Beijing students. They were also cut off from 
various potentially moderating influences. Only 
those most committed to the struggle had made 
the trip- to Heijing. Where local students 
constantly mingled with less committed or less 
radical classmates, and thus were reminded that 
their views were particularly strong, those from 
outside Beijing had few such contacts. Local 
students also talked more often to family 
members and to teachers. Perhaps most impor-
tant, the students--from outside of Beijing were 
not well integrated into the leadership of the 
movement. They had no voice in the most 
prominent .ranks of leaders, and there were 
fewer strands of communication spreading 
information, views, and instructions among 
them. 
These students from outside Beijing played a 
central role in -the decision not to withdraw 
from Tiananmen Square at the very end of 
May, a few days before the massacre. They 
had not been in the protest as long, and so were 
perhaps not as tired- of it. More to the point, 
withdrawing from the Square meant returning 
to their own homes or campuses. This .might 
expose them :to retaliation from local officials 
(many of-whom were less sympathetic to ·the 
protests than were leaders. of some of the 
Beijing campuses, nearly all of which had at 
least large and powerful proreform factions). It 
would also cut them off from the center of 
protest. ~Beijing·students could stay intensively 
involved after a withdrawal; at best those from 
other -cities could try to carry on with local 
protests but out of both the limelight and the 
main lines of communication. 
Many of the non-Beijing students did leave 
during the first three days of June, but this may 
have-meant that those who stayed were all the 
more detennined. In any case, on the fateful 
night of June 3, as the anny approached 
Tiananmen Square, the students from outside 
Beijing are reputed to have decided for the 
most part to stay put while large numbers of 
local students withdrew to the south. 
Leaving Tiananmen Square was important 
not just to avoid a massacre. At the time, no 
one expected a massacre of the sort wrought 
June 3 and 4. Students expected tear gas and 
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rubber bullets. Rather. the issue was how to 
reorient the movement towards Iong-tenn 
struggle rather than short-term protest. Even 
among those who shared this view, there were 
reasonable arguments for staying in Tiananmen 
Square-the need for a focal point, for 
example, and for continuing· to show the 
citizens of Beijing that their suppon was 
necessary. The point is not to judge whether 
withdrawal would have been the right move or 
wrong. Rather, it is to see how hard it is for a 
movement like this to transform itself into the 
sort of organization that can carry out a 
long-term struggle, shifting as necessary from 
what Gramsci would caif the war of position. to 
the war of maneuver-or in this case back again. 
One of the difficulties faced by the Chinese 
student protesters in 1989 was that they lacked 
the luxury of building a movement gradually; 
carrying on discussions, and building solidari-
ties over a period of months or years. It is true 
that the movement had grown out of months of 
complaint about China's current situation, .not 
sprung full blown into .action after Hu 
Yaobang's death. It is true also that it is not an 
isolated event but the· latest in a series of 
prodemocratic protests including those of 
1'979-80 and 198fr-87 -and stretching back 
.also to the mourning of Zhou Enlai, the 
Chinese Revolution of 1949, the May 4th 
movement of 1919, the Republican Revolution 
of 1911, and the examination candidates' 
remonstration and repression of l895. Nonethe-
less, at least in recent -years, prodemocracy 
protests have been relatively brief incidents, 
not long-tenn movements. The government has 
repeatedly shown ·its capacity to stifle public 
discussion. China is remarkably-lacking in free 
spaces for such discourse. Compared even to 
-the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China is 
short on institutions of "society'' separate from 
the· state, and· short on privacy. A bit more of 
either of these would aUow more publication of 
an unofficial press, for example, or more links 
.to be forged between members of different 
potentially oppositional groups, such as work-
ers and students. 
Without either free public spaces or privacy, 
democracy is unlikely to get very far. It is 
possible that reform will bring more of each to 
China over the next few years. It is likely 'that 
there will be more flowerings of dissent like the 
student movement of this past spring. But until 
deeper roots are 1aid, such protests will 
continue to echo the old Confucian idea of the 
people (or the intellectuals) remonstrating with 
the ruler. They will not be manifestations of 
alternative bases for government so much as 
attempts to remind those in power of their 
responsibilities. One of the main significances 
of the tactical difficulties I have described, and 
of the particular pattern of success the 
movement achieved, -is that they do not suggest 
a capacity to supplant the government so much 
as to deliver it a kick in the rear. The govern-
ment has responded so far ·mainly :by ·.ldcking 
back. It may also -try to Clean up its. act, for 
example by policing corruption more closely. 
This kind of popular movementcan·hope·mainly 
for concessions. Its strengths are :its ability to 
make life difficult for leaders, and especially to· 
play leaders off against -each other.~ 
The long scope-of Chinese history can breed 
depression over the slow pace of progress or 
optimism because marty-rs ·are-notJorgptten. In. 
trying to further the cause for which people-
died this year, a key issue·will-be whether ties 
can be forged among :different groups-
intellectuals, students, workers-, entrepreneurs, 
officials, and peasants. -For al.l-buLthe last there 
were at least the beginnings_ of joint efforts. in 
this spring's protest. If these can begin- to be 
secured, or even institutionalized, ·then there 
will be a stronger basis next time. That there 
will be a next time seems almost certain. 
Whether it will be in two years, five years, or 
ten is less clear. At some point in ·the not too 
distant future, Deng Xiaoping will die~ at that 
time a new power struggle within ·the govern-
ment will quite likely create an ·qpening· for 
protest from without. In-the meantime, theway 
will be paved for the next struggle if~discussion 
improves ideas, if associational links are 
strengthened, and -if the memory of this 
movement is kept alive. · None of these, 
however, is an easy task. D 
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